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COMMENTARY
ROBERT W. HAMILTON*
The application of the "business judgment" rule to decisions by
boards of directors or committees not to proceed with derivative litiga-
tion against directors or management raises novel and difficult ques-
tions. Mr. Duesenberg's well written article ably presents one side of
this controversy; as he states, he is offering "a defense of the rule in its
more expansive application."' Mr. Duesenberg is writing from the per-
spective of a general counsel and secretary of a major publicly held
corporation, and that perspective-bias, if you will-shows.
The first part of this Commentary offers a critique of Mr. Duesen-
berg's article; the second part consists of my own analysis of the com-
plex issues under discussion.
I.
One basic problem with the Duesenberg article is that he has an ex-
treme view of the world of derivative litigation. Mr. Duesenberg is un-
usually candid in stating his premises, and at the risk of overstating
them somewhat, I list them as follows:
1. Almost all derivative litigation is devoid of substantive merit.
"Filing lawsuits with little or no merit has become, it seems, a way of
life with many lawyers. ... 
2. Most groundless derivative litigation is settled only because of
the cost of litigation to the enterprise and to the defendants. "The
overdeposed,' over-interrogated and over-discovered defendant, pur-
sued by teams of lawyers, becomes victimized by the process, not by the
conduct which is alleged wrongfully to have been committed.
Pragmatists as they are, managers reluctantly turn their attention to
settlement, not to avoid adjudication of their alleged guilt, but to end
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the process and return their labors to [the enterprise]. .... 3
3. Derivative litigation is not necessary to assure proper conduct of
corporate fiduciaries. That such litigation should be viewed as the
"'principal means' for enforcing managerial fiduciary responsibilities
reflects either a cynical view of human action or an uninformed per-
spective of how management works."4
(a) Management is dominantly driven "by the desire to perform ef-
fective and superior wealth-producing roles. . in a culturally accept-
able manner."5
(b) Boards and managers do not "consciously skirt close to the
margin of illegality or moral turpitude to achieve private aggrandize-
ment or gain competitive advantage.' 6 To believe that they do is to
"indulge in fantasy."7
(c) Corporate management is "circumscribed by a plethora of other
constraints [from all sides]." 8 No significant decision can be made
"without in depth examination of wide ranging regulations, contract
rights, and business and social pressures, many of which impact or
sometimes totally control the decisionmaking outcome."9
4. Unwarranted dismissals of shareholder litigation will not occur
because directors not personally involved in claimed misconduct have
the independence and objectivity of judgment to review and defini-
tively dispose of shareholder litigation. " [B]oard members are typi-
cally strong-willed individuals, not easily maneuvered and quite
capable of identifying where they have a bad situation on hand that
requires unpleasant resolution."'" There is, in short, very little to the
argument that even independent directors have a "structural bias" in
favor of defendants. "There is a very real limit to the structural bias
argument, it seems, and that limit is reached quickly in difficult
situations." 1"
5. Recognizing that the directors' power to close off shareholder de-
rivative litigation is subject to abuse, the possible cost is outweighed by
3. Id
4. Id at 332.
5. Id.
6. Id
7. Id
8. Id'at 334.
9. Id
10. Id at 339-40.
11. Id at 340, n. 120.
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the value of preserving to responsible management those conditions
"that are critical to effective, and hopefully profitable, leadership."
12
"The goal is a decision in the interest of the entity, and the greater
understanding of its needs by those who manage it is a healthy trade-
off for the minimal impact that may flow from a 'structural bias' la-
bored under by a well-chosen body performing its assignment thor-
oughly and in good faith."' 3
6. Finally, the power to dispose of shareholder litigation by director
action is not really unlimited, since the courts have the power to give
"close scrutiny to afford reasonable assurance of the integrity of the
process."' 4 Further, where instances of "egregious wrong" actually
show up, "the requisite of disinterest or independence has proven suffi-
ciently elastic to achieve the measure of judicial supervision desired."' 5
If one accepts these premises, there seems little justification for re-
taining the derivative suit at all. Certainly, any step that reduces the
availability of such litigation should be applauded.
What should one say about an argument based on such views of the
world? I am willing to accept that there is some truth in most of Mr.
Duesenberg's premises. I do not see, however, how one can accept the
premise that derivative litigation is almost always without substantive
merit. I have heard the same point of view expressed by several other
sophisticated and intelligent lawyers who are house counsel for, or rep-
resent, other major American corporations. I have also heard precisely
the opposite point of view expressed with equal force by equally so-
phisticated and intelligent lawyers who form part of the plaintifs bar.
The limited available empirical evidence, as well as academic commen-
tary, tends to favor the latter point of view. The truth, I suspect, lies
somewhere between the extreme views.
Even if there is some truth in most of Mr. Duesenberg's premises, it
is inconceivable that they are so largely applicable across the broad
range of corporations in modem American society that they should
form the basis for prescriptive rules. It is likely that Mr. Duesenberg
had in mind only the kind of corporation with which he is most famil-
iar; the large, publicly held corporation, in which shareholder voting
power is diffused and highly qualified outside directors constitute a ma-
12. Id at 340.
13. Id at 342.
14. Id at 341.
15. Id at 329.
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jority of the board. His argument, however, is not so limited and ap-
plies equally to derivative litigation involving small or medium-sized
corporations or majority shareholder-dominated corporations as well
as Fortune 500 corporations.
I am also troubled by Mr. Duesenberg's assumption that simple stan-
dards of "independence" and "disinterest" sufficient to avoid "disa-
bling self-interest"' 6 will automatically yield a committee with the
independence of mind and spirit that Mr. Duesenberg envisions. Even
if many independent directors do have these laudable qualities, some
nominally independent directors are too old, too trusting, too cautious,
not very intelligent, or so eager to stay on the board that they will ac-
cept management's explanation for practically anything.17 A commit-
tee composed of such persons is a stacked committee. And, it is no less
stacked if an independent lawyer, retired judge, or similar notable is
appointed as special investigator since that person has to deal with a
committee and is influenced by the underlying views or beliefs of that
committee. In other words, Duesenberg's belief that an "independent"
committee is not likely to whitewash a sticky or embarrassing situation
or outright illegal conduct seems implausible. It is quite conceivable
that an "independent" committee might do precisely that.
My second major criticism of Mr. Duesenberg's analysis is that he
significantly misstates the character or nature of much derivative litiga-
tion. He assumes that practically all recent derivative litigation deals
with illegal payments or stock options machinations, situations in
which Mr. Duesenberg persuasively argues that directoral discretion is
usually appropriate. Such cases, however, represent only a small pro-
portion of all derivative litigation. Mr. Duesenberg states "[t]he pano-
ply of malfeasance that derivative actions may attempt to redress is not,
of course, limited to foreign payments and stock option machinations.
As a hypothetical matter, the instances of misconduct can be much
broader. A survey of cases occurring in the 1970s, the halcyon days of
the anticorporate activists, discloses other types of complaints, to be
sure, but again in most of these the courts confirmed the power of the
board to terminate the action."'" (emphasis added) To this statement
16. Id at 329.
17. See e.g., Shao, Amax Fees Paid to Some Outside Directors Stir Questions About Their
Independence, Wall St. J., Apr. 1, 1982, at 10, col. 1.
18. See Duesenberg, supra note 1, at 328.
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Mr. Duesenberg appends a footnote citing four cases, surprisingly none
of which were decided during the 1970s.
One does not really have to guess about the nature of derivative liti-
gation during the 1970s, or rely on cases decided before and after that
period. There is a published empirical study covering data on deriva-
tive and class litigation filed against 205 corporations during the period
1970-1978.19 While this study was primarily concerned with disposi-
tions of such litigation, it also gives some information about the nature
of the claims being pursued. For example, the 20 suits leading to the
largest monetary settlements during the 1970s involved the following
complaints:
disclosure fraud;
misrepresentation in exchange offer;
improper sale of subsidiary;
disclosure violations;
disclosure fraud;
disclosure violations;
unfair tender offer;
disclosure fraud;
prospectus disclosure violations;
improper sale of shares;
securities violations;
unfair merger,
unfair merger,
illegal contributions and improper compensation;
disclosure violations and insider trading;
unfair treatment of subsidiaries;
illegal tender offer;
disclosure violations;
excessive compensation; and
disclosure violations.20
My point is simply that while some of these suits involved illegal pay-
ments and stock options, many of them involved much more tradi-
tional kinds of management abuse. Thus, there is really no support for
the statement that "instances of egregrious wrong are extremely rare in
19. Jones, .4n Empirical Examination of the Resolution of Shareholder Derivative and Class
Action Lawsuits, 60 B.U.L. REv. 542 (1980).
20. Id., at 548-549. This list consists of a description of the merits of the first 20 settlements
described in Table Il. Some of them appear to involve class action rather than derivative law
suits.
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the cases. . ." (footnotes omitted).21 Mr. Duesenberg simply was
looking in the wrong place.
This recent empirical study also sheds light on Mr. Duesenberg's as-
sumption that most derivative litigation is without merit, though the
data are not conclusive. A total of 531 suits were brought during the
1970s against the 190 Fortune 500 corporations involved in the study.
Of these, 100 were pending at the close of the period and 71 had been
disposed of in an unknown manner during the period. Thus, the study
considered the disposition of 360 suits. Of these, 246 were settled, 16
led to judgments for plaintiffs or defendant compliance with the de-
mands of the plaintiff, and 72 were complete victories for the defend-
ants [59 by dismissal and 13 by judgment]. In another 14 cases suits
were dismissed because class action status was denied. Since complete
victories or complete defeats account for a small proportion of all the
cases, the evaluation of the derivative suit largely revolves around an
appraisal of the 246 cases that were settled. Fifty-five settlements, in-
volving 228 of the 246 suits, were described in sufficient detail to be
analyzed. Of these, 23 involved settlements ranging from $34,000,000
to $1,000,000, another 15 involved settlements from $930,000 to
$44,000, and one involved a payment of only $4500. Obviously, abso-
lute amounts paid in settlement are an unreliable guide to substantive
merit in the absence of information about the reasonable amount ini-
tially in dispute. The large amounts paid in many of these settlements,
however, tend not to support Mr. Duesenberg's belief that derivative
suits are usually groundless and settlements involve defendants buying
their peace from rapacious plaintiffs' attorneys.
Another facet of this study is that ten settlements involving fourteen
suits included nonmonetary" agreements by the corporation to make
changes in their internal corporate governance. This category included
several illegal payment cases. If these cases had been subjected to the
unlimited business judgment rule dismissal urged by Mr. Duesenberg,
it is unlikely that this type of relief would have occurred.
The academic literature cited by Mr. Duesenberg, as well as the draft
of the American Law Institute study on corporate governance which he
criticizes, treat the continued vitality of the derivative suit as an impor-
tant control over corporate conduct. Mr. Duesenberg attacks this posi-
tion frontally, stating that "[n1o empirical evidence suggests that
21. See Duesenberg, supra note 1, at 329.
[Vol. 60:345
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol60/iss2/4
COMMENTARY
lawsuits or their threat have any major impact in keeping others in
line, '2 2 and the belief that derivative litigation is the principal means of
enforcing managerial responsibility "reflects either a cynical view of
human action or an uninformed perspective of how management
works."23 The comments being criticized, of course, are not original
with the authors but are based on judicial statements from a number of
different opinions.
Given the unattractive choice of being cynical or uninformed, I opt
for a "cynical view of human action."24 In my view much human ac-
tion is constrained to some extent by the recognition that if certain con-
duct is engaged in, then unpleasant consequences may follow.
Derivative litigation is simply one of those unpleasant consequences.
To choose examples at random, I am sure that many lawyers (and law
professors, too, for that matter) would not report all their income for
tax purposes except for the civil and criminal consequences of getting
caught; similarly, sexual relationships between university professors
and their students probably occur with less frequency than they other-
wise would because of the unpleasant consequences that follow from
being caught. Now, there are doubtless many lawyers who report all
their income for tax purposes as a matter of principle and would do so
even though all sanctions for nonreporting were eliminated. Similarly,
some professors would doubtless avoid relationships with students even
if there were no sanctions. But we are not talking only about high-
minded people; we are talking about many persons, a continuum of
personalities with varying degrees of moral standards, from high to me-
dium to virtually nonexistent. It seems unnecessary to require "empiri-
cal evidence" to show such fundamental aspects of human behavior.
Thus, I am willing to concede that many members of management are
guided by the principles described by Mr. Duesenberg, and they would
continue to be so guided even without the sanctions of the derivative
22. Id at 332.
23. Id
24. Id Most of the law review analysis cited by Mr. Duesenberg was written by law profes-
sors, and it may be that Mr. Duesenberg believes that the other altemative--"an uninformed
perspective of how management works"-applies to the (theoretician) law professor who may lack
experience in the "real world." However, the law professors who have written on derivative litiga-
tion generally have experience in corporate practice, often for five or more years before going into
teaching; many also maintain active practice or "of counsel" relationships on the side that con-
stantly expose them to the nonacademic world. It would be convenient to dismiss all academic
comment with which one disagrees as "uninformed" but that is not factually accurate.
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suits. To my mind, however, that is not enough to justify a significant
dilution or elimination of all sanctions applicable to everyone.
II.
I turn now to the fundamental substantive issue addressed by Mr.
Duesenberg. The basic issue is whether corporate management
(broadly defined) should be given complete and essentially unreview-
able discretion to decide which claims of breach of fiduciary duty may
be investigated by the adversary judicial system and which may not.
Even if one assumes that these "go/no go" decisions are always made
in basic good faith by persons with no direct financial involvement in
the outcome, I doubt that corporate management should have that
broad a power. Self-investigation too easily becomes an apology or a
justification for what has occurred rather than an investigation. This is
not solely a matter of "structural bias," as Mr. Duesenberg uses the
term, or an adverse reflection on the independence or honesty of direc-
tors. It is a commentary on the fundamental human characteristic of
loyalty which gets in the way of effective self-investigation.25
On the other hand, I find equally unsatisfactory the position taken by
the Court of Chancery in the Maldonado26 litigation that "courts and
25. I am reminded of the "self-investigation" by the Commissioner of the Food and Drug
Administration in the 1970s of charges that high level FDA staff personnel were biased in favor of
the drug industry and had engaged in abusive personnel practices. This self-investigation was
conducted by persons without any involvement in the specific events in question and reviewed by
a Commissioner who had taken office long after the events investigated had occurred. The princi-
pal investigator was a highly competent attorney, now with a prestigious Washington D.C. law
firm. However, all the persons who conducted and reviewed the "self-investigation" had consider-
able loyalty to the Food and Drug Administration and shared a concern that widely publicized
charges might injure the effectiveness of FDA regulation. The "self-investigation" did not resolve
the charges satisfactorily in the eyes of many observers, and a subsequent reinvestigation was
made by a truly independent panel (of which I was a member) appointed by the Secretary of
Health, Education & Welfare. This reinvestigation revealed that while many of the individual
allegations turned out to be dubious or unfounded (e.g., involving only clashes of strong personal-
ities with different but reasonable regulatory philosophies or almost paranoid claims of mistreat-
ment by the complainants), the commissioner's "self-investigation" was itself defensive and self-
serving. It did not uncover, for example, one relatively clear case of perjury in a sworn affidavit,
and a number of equally clear and apparently intentional violations of personnel regulations.
Despite this rather negative evaluation of the "self-investigation," I am convinced that it was
honestly conducted, and that its failure lay in the natural tendency of institutional self-investiga-
tions to minimize or overlook marginal or wrongful conduct.
26. Maldonado v. Flynn, 413 A.2d 1251, 1283 (Del. Ch. 1980), rev'd, Zapata Corp. v. Maldo-
nado, 430 A.2d 779 (1981).
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not litigants should decide the merits of litigation."'27 This position re-
sults in a corporation that has lost all control over how its litigation
resources are to be employed. It must fight even patently absurd or
clearly discretionary decisions through discovery, at least until a judge
can be persuaded that the suit is so without merit that it should be
dismissed. I therefore accept Mr. Duesenberg's argument to the extent
that in some areas, such as suits seeking to surcharge directors for ille-
gal corporate payments from which they did not personally profit,
courts should give considerable weight to a committee decision that liti-
gation should not be pursued.
The problem, as I see it, is to articulate a middle ground, which en-
courages courts to accept reasonable business decisions not to pursue
litigation without binding them to accept all such decisions in all cases
merely on the basis that minimum procedural requirements were fol-
lowed. It is also important that this review of the "go/no go" decision
itself not become bogged down in a procedural morass or be preceded
by excessive and expensive pretrial procedures.
In recent months, there have been several attempts to develop such a
middle ground. The innovative opinion by the Delaware Supreme
Court in Maldonado28 was the first attempt. This opinion points out
the dangers involved when "directors are passing judgment on fellow
directors in the same corporation and fellow directors, in this instance,
who designated them to serve both as directors and committee mem-
bers"29 and attempts to steer "a middle course between those cases
which yield to the independent business judgment of a board commit-
tee and this case as determined below which would yield to unbridled
plaintiff stockholder control. '3 0 The solution adopted was a two step
analysis: first, the establishment of the independence and good faith of
the committee (as Mr. Duesenberg proposes), and second, the Court
should apply its own "independent business judgment" to the question
whether the motion to dismiss should be granted. This second require-
ment was designed to pick up situations where formal requisites of in-
dependence were met but where the grievance would appear to deserve
further consideration in the corporation's interest.
The draft of the American Law Institute study on Corporate Gov-
27. Maldonado v. Flynn, 413 A.2d at 1263.
28. Zapata Corp. v. Maldonado, 430 A.2d 779 (Del. 1981).
29. Id at 787.
30. Id at 788.
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ernance, obviously strongly influenced by the Maldonado opinion, sug-
gests that the Court should exercise its own "independent judgment" to
evaluate whether the business justification for dismissal put forth by an
independent committee is outweighed by other factors relating to the
best interests of the corporation as a whole. I am not sure whether the
word "business" in the Maldonado formulation adds to or subtracts
from the tentative ALI standard; it probably adds little.
The "independent business judgment" standard of Maldonado is
strongly criticized by Mr. Duesenberg. He first suggests that no one
knows what "independent business judgment" means in this context;
that the choice of words should be viewed "as unfortunate and confus-
ing" and he hopes that the second branch of the test is only a restate-
ment of the principle that the "irrationality of any decision that is
reached" may bring into question the validity of the procedures em-
ployed.3" That is obviously a crabbed reading of the Court's opinion.
In context, it is perfectly clear that the Delaware Supreme Court was
ordering courts to assess the wisdom of the committee's decision in the
light of the best interests of the corporation.
In a recent article32 two practitioners also reject the "independent
judgment" test of Maldonado but propose an intermediate position that
also seems plausible. They criticize the "independent business judg-
ment" test as being "so open-ended," so complicated, and so "subject
to judicial whimsy" 33 that it will inevitably fail to be a simple, inexpen-
sive and straightforward way to eliminate derivative litigation that is
detrimental or undesirable. They then suggest the following as a
substitute:
In certain extraordinary cases the court should go beyond good faith,
independence and due care and examine the merits of the committee's
decision to ascertain whether there may have been an "abuse of discre-
tion." It may also be appropriate in these cases to shift the burden of
proof to the directors on the issues of due care, independence and good
faith. Such cases should include (1) self-dealing transactions involving
controlling shareholders, (2) sales of all, or substantially al of the corpo-
ration's assets, (3) efforts taken to resist tender offers, and (4) other trans-
actions so critical to the operations and profitability of the company that
failure to pursue the claim might seriously impair the future of the com-
31. See Duesenberg, supra note 1, at 343. (footnote omitted).
32. Block & Prussin, The Business Judgment Rule and Shareholder Derivation .4ctions: Viva
Zapata4 37 Bus. LAW 27 (1981).
33. Id. at 62.
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pany . . . [S]uch an overview of the merits, to determine whether the
board's action was within the bounds of a reasonable exercise of discre-
tion, is not a new concept under the business judgment rule, but has often
been used where the transaction at issue was of special importance.34
To my mind, this approach addresses the problem I have with both
polar views. I view an "overview of the merits to determine whether
the board's action was within the bounds of a reasonable exercise of
discretion" to differ in degree and not in kind from the Maldonado test
of "independent business judgment". Even in Mr. Duesenberg's "more
expansive" reading, there may be some give. He notes that an irra-
tional result may at least be questioned by a court by a review of proce-
dures. In a way, it is regrettable that the first decisions in this line of
cases took such dogmatic and polar extreme positions.35 The resulting
rhetoric may have masked a core of common agreement that some kind
of judicial control has to be imposed on the otherwise unlimited power
of independent committees to dismiss derivative litigation. The issue is
when, how much, and with what degree of freedom.
34. Id. at 72. The authors also discuss how to obtain independent and disinterested persons
to review transactions and what the record should consist of for the court to review. These are
substantial questions that also must be addressed if the process of handling derivative suits is to be
an efficient one. This brief commentary does not permit an examination of these proposals.
35. Mr. Duesenberg argues that an "independent business judgment" by a court on the dis-
continuance of litigation is fundamentally inconsistent with one of the basic principles underlying
the business judgment rule: judges are not experts or businessmen and therefore should not re-
view or second guess directors' business decisions. The cases are studded with examples of judi-
cial declarations of inadequacy to establish dividend policy, to decide what cash reserves an
automobile company needs, and so forth. Is the question of dismissing a derivative suit against
fiduciaries of the same class? I submit that it is not. Lawyers may not be very good businessmen,
and judges may be lawyers who are even worse businessmen than the average. But one thing
every lawyer can do is to evaluate the probabilities of success of a lawsuit, and whether a settle-
ment seems reasonable, given the uncertainties of litigation. We are not talking about the cash
needs of an unfamiliar business; we are talking about whether a law suit charging misconduct has
so little potential advantage to a corporation or chance of success that management's recommen-
dation that it should be dismissed should be accepted. A judge should be able to decide this about
as readily as a businessman. This issue is really no different from judicial decisions, for example,
weighing the reasonableness of proposed settlement of derivative litigation, of litigation involving
the rights of a minor or an incompetent, and so forth. I should add that a dictum in the recent
case of Joy v. North, 519 F. Supp. 1312, 1328, n. 9, (D. Conn. 1981), states that the court "dis-
agrees with the approach recently adopted by the Delaware Supreme Court" in Maldonado since
"[tihere is simply no basis to assume that a court is more qualified than the directors or the share-
holders to assess the merits and values of a derivative suit to the corporation." I fail to see why
this should be so, given the nature of the inquiry into a proposed settlement.
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